ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
A session key can be exchanged between two users by using a key exchange protocol and assures a secure communication for later sessions. The first practical key exchange protocol is proposed by Diffie-Hellman [1] . Later improvements are made on this protocol. As it is simple for the users to remember the passwords, password based key exchange protocol achieved greater attention. Even though the protocol is simple and efficient, according to Ding and Horster [2] , it should not be vulnerable to any type of off line, undetectable or detectable on line password guessing attacks, since the passwords are of low-entropy. In general the password guessing attacks can be divided into three classes and they are listed below:
• Detectable on-line password guessing attacks: An attacker attempts to use a guessed password in an on-line transaction. He/She verifies the correctness of his/her guess using the response from server. A failed guess can be detected and logged by the server.
• Undetectable on-line password guessing attacks: Similar to Detectable on-line password guessing attack, an attacker tries to verify a password guess in an on-line transaction. However, a failed guess can not be detected and logged by server, as server is not able to distinguish an honest request from a malicious one.
• Off-line password guessing attacks: An attacker guesses a password and verifies his/her guess off-line. No participation of server is required, so the server does not notice the attack.
Bellovin and Merrit proposed Encrypted key exchange protocol [3] . Later many efficient key exchange protocols based on password have been developed [4, 5, 6, 7, 8] . Recently these two party key exchange protocols are extended to three party, in which, the two parties initially communicates the passwords with the trusted server securely. Later the server authenticates the clients when they want to agree upon a session key. Steiner et al proposed three party protocol [9] . Later Lin etal showed that STW-3 PEKE protocol falls to undetectable on-line password guessing attack, off-line password guessing attacks and proposed two versions of improved three party key exchange protocols [10] . Recently Chang and Chang [11] proposed a novel three party encrypted key exchange protocol (ECC-3PEKE protocol) without server public key and claimed the protocol is secure, efficient and practical. Unlike their claims Yoon and Yoo [12] pointed out an Undetectable password guessing attack on their protocol, in which one party is able to know the other party's password and furthermore they presented an improved version of it to avoid the above attack. A key recovery attack [13] is also proved on ECC-3PEKE protocol using the Undetectable online password guessing attack proposed by Yoon and Yoo.
In this paper an impersonation attack on ECC-3 PEKE protocol is proposed using the Undetectable password guessing attack proposed by Yoon and Yon. A Client B can impersonate as Client A and communicate with Client C. While C is thinking that it is communicating with Client A but actually it is communicating with Client B. If a malicious party able to guess the password of another, then the same malicious party will impersonate as the client (the one whose password is guessed).
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 briefly reviews the ECC-3PEKE protocol, section 3 reviews undetectable password guessing attack on ECC-3PEKE protocol. Section 4 describes the impersonation attack on ECC-3PEKE protocol and the concluding remarks are made in section 5. Step 6: B authenticates A by checking f K (ID A ,K).If successful, B confirms A's knowledge of the session key K = g RSRARB . Figure 1 illustrates ECC-3PEKE protocol
REVIEW OF ECC-3PEKE PROTOCOL

UNDETECTABLE ONLINE PASSWORD GUESSING ATTACK ON CHANG AND CHANG PROTOCOL
This section demonstrates the undetectable password guessing attack on Chang-Chang protocol as proposed by Yoon and Yoo [7] with the assumption of B as malicious party. The procedure of the above attack is given below: A malicious party B guesses the password of A using Undetectable password guessing attack as proposed by Yoon and Yoo. B uses the password of A for impersonating A, when A and C wants to communicate. The following procedure presents the attack in detail.
IMPERSONATION ATTACK ON ECC-3PEKE PROTOCOL
Step 1 Step 6: C authenticates A(C is thinking B as A) by checking f K (ID A ,K).If successful, C confirms A's knowledge of the session key K = g RSRARB . Figure 3 illustrates impersonation attack on ECC-3PEKE protocol. Similarly impersonation of the responder works on the same protocol.
CONCLUSIONS
Recently Chang and Chang proposed a novel three party simple key exchange protocol. They claimed the protocol is secure, efficient and practical. Unless their claims Yoon and Yoo, presented an Undetectable online password guessing attack on the above protocol. A key recovery attack is also proved on Chang and Chang protocol using the Undetectable online password guessing attack proposed by Yoon and Yoo. In the similar line, an impersonation of initiator attack is demonstrated on ECC-3PEKE protocol. An impersonation of the responder attack also equally applies to the above protocol.
